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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
LEO I. TANNEHILL, 
Plat'ntiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 9154 
LEWIS N. TERRY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(The parties will be referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment upon 
a verdict of No Cause of Action (R. 62). This action 
was for personal injuries alleged to have resulted when 
plaintiff was hit in the head with a golf club negligently 
swung by defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff visited defendant at the latter's home in 
Ogden on Sunday afterno?n, May 4, 1958 at approxi-
mately 3 :30 or 4:00 o'clock. Defendant had just bought a 
set of golf clubs and had been taking golf lessons (R. 5). 
Defendant suggested they go to the back of his place and 
knock a few balls. Defendant had some small, plastic 
practice balls (R. 5). The defendant's house faced the 
north and the two went out the south, or back, door on to 
a platform and then down some steps to a sidewalk which 
ran east and west. To the south of this sidewalk was 
grass. Defendant placed a cocoa mat on the grass, placed 
a ball on it and hit it to the east, or to his left (Tr. 7). 
Defendant then placed another ball on the mat for plain-
tiff to hit (Tr. 7). As plaintiff grasped the club defend-
ant told him he was not holding it correctly. He then 
came over and took the club from plaintiff and defendant 
proceeded to show plaintiff how to hold the club and 
position his body (Tr. 8). 
The foregoing facts are not in dispute. At this point 
a dispute arises between the parties. According to de-
fendant, he stated: "Leo, (plaintiff), will you get out of 
the way, I am going to hit the ball" (Tr. 44). Plaintiff 
denied that any such warning was given him. He testified 
that defendant told him to stand off to the left and told 
him to watch the position of his body and the angle of 
the club. Plaintiff testified that that is when he was hit 
(Tr. 8). 
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Again the parties are in agreement as to what oc-
curred thereafter. 
Defendant testified that after he had addressed the 
ball it took him smne ti1ne to get in proper position to 
hit it. He testified "I had been told to keep my head 
down, I assumed Leo was out of the road because I told 
him to get out of the road, and I swung and hit him" 
('Tr. 44). Defendant stated that he did not look to see 
whether plaintiff actually got out of the way (Tr. 51). 
He admitted that he did not know where plaintiff was at 
the tin1e he swung (Tr. 52). Plaintiff was hit on the 
follow through part of the swing. 
Plaintiff fell back on the steps and the next thing 
he knew someone had raised him up. l-Ie was sitting on 
the sidewalk and blood was coming from his head (Tr. 8). 
He was given a towel to absorb the flow of blood and was 
taken to a hospital. The outer table of bone of the front 
sinus immediately to the left of the nose, was broken 
through. He also received a subluxated coccyx when he 
fell against the steps. 
The case was submitted to a jury and the jury re-
turned a verdict of No Cause of Action (R. 56). Plain-
tiff contends the trial court committed error in its in-
structions to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
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POINT II. 
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS 
AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SAID 
SUBJECT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
The trial court by its Instruction No.8 (R. 19), sub-
mitted the issue of assumption of risk to the jury. It is 
the contention of plaintiff that this issue should not have 
been submitted to the jury in a case with the factual situ-
ation presented here. The only defense involved here 
was that of contributory negligence. 
Under the facts of this case defendant was under a 
continuing obligation to be careful in connection with his 
swinging of the club. This duty was present right up 
until the time plaintiff was struck. This is not a situation 
where defendant had no duty toward the plaintiff after he 
had given his so-called warning. He admitted that he 
addressed the ball for some space of time and that he did 
not know where plaintiff was, nor even look to see where 
he was at the time he swung his club. There is no evidence 
that the plaintiff consented to this type of conduct or 
danger. 
In 2 Harper & James, tlzc Law of Torts, §21.1, p. 
1162, the authorities speak of the two distinct types of 
so-called assumption of risk: 
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"(1) In its primary sense the plaintiff's 
assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of 
the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plain-
tiff from that risk. In such a case plaintiff may 
not recover for his injury even though he was 
quite reasonable in encountering the risk that 
caused it. Volenti non fit injuria. (2) A plaintiff 
may also be said to assume a risk created by de-
fendant's breach of duty towards him, when he 
deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. In 
such a case, except possibly in master and servant 
cases, plaintiff will be barred from recovery only 
if he was unreasonable in encountering the risk 
under the circumstances. This is a form of con-
tributory negligence. Hereafter we shall call this 
'assumption of risk in a secondary sense.' " 
We submit that the only real defense of assumption 
of risk is the first type, that the second type is, and can 
only be, contributory negligence. Our contention on this 
is confirmed by the Restatement of the Law of Torts. 
There is no distinct defense of assumption of risk therein 
treated. The only place assumption of risk is considered 
is under the heading of contributory negligence. See 2 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 466. In order for 
there to be contributory negligence there must not only 
be an intentional exposure to danger created by defend-
ant's negligence, but, also, that exposure must be un-
reasonable. This latter element is not set forth in the 
court's instruction on assumption of risk. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in two 
comparatively recent cases, has rejected the defense of 
assumption of risk as applicable to the cases being con-
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sidered. Clay v. Dunford, 120 Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075 
(1952); Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d 
884 (1959). In discussing the elements of this defense 
this court, in the Clay case, stated: 
"The texts referred to by defendant in sup-
port of its position that the deceased assumed the 
risk, do not seem to bear out such position. They 
say that 'The doctrine of assumption of risk in an 
action between persons not master and servant, 
or not having relations by contract with each 
other, is confined to cases where the plaintiff not 
only knew and appreciated the danger, but volun-
tarily put himself in the way of it,' and that 'The 
essential elements of assumed risk are knowledge, 
actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specifiJc 
defect or dangerous condition caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant in the violation of some 
duty owing to the plaintiff, * * * together with 
the plaintiff's appreciation of the danger to be 
encountered and his voluntary exposure of himself 
to it.' They also clearly set forth the distinctions 
between the doctrines of assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence. 
"The uncontroverted evidence showed that 
at the time of the accident the deceased was stand-
ing on the shoulder of the highway where vehicles 
ordinarily do not travel, with his back turned to 
the oncoming truck, completely negativing knowl-
edge or appreciation of the specific danger, and 
negativing any intention voluntarily to expose 
himself to a known danger, - elements which 
must be established before the defense of assump-
tion of risk is applicable." 
In the Johnson case this court stated concerning 
assumption of risk: 
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"·The fundamental consideration underlying 
it is that one should not be permitted to know-
ingly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of per-
sonal harm when he has the ability to avoid doing 
so, and then hold another responsible for his in-
jury. Its essential elements are: knowledge of a 
danger and a free and voluntary consent to as-
sume it. 
"Under any reasonable view of the evidence 
here the conduct of the plaintiff would not fall 
within the requisites of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk. This was the type of hazard which would 
exist at practically every intersection where there 
is much traffic. It is not shown that plaintiff was 
aware of the particular danger involved in the 
approach of the defendant's car, nor that having 
such knowledge, she nevertheless assumed the risk 
of such danger and proceeded. The true issue of 
fact to be determined as to her conduct was the 
usual one: did she use the care which an ordin-
ary, reasonable and prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances. That is, was she 
guilty of contributory negligence." 
Some authorities make the distinction that contribu-
tory negligence is carelessness and assumption of risk 
is venturousness. There certainly is nothing venturous 
about the plaintiff's conduct in this case. It was a ques-
tion of whether or not he exercised ordinary care for his 
own safety at the time he was hit. In distinguishing be-
tween these two defenses, the court, in Kleppe v. Prawl, 
181 Kan. 590, 313 P. 2d 227, 63 A.L.R. 2d 175, stated as 
follows: 
"While assumption of risk is somewhat akin 
to contributory negligence, these two doctrines 
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of law are not synonymous because assumption of 
risk arises through implied contract of assuming 
the risk of a known danger ; the essence of it is 
venturousness; it implies intentional exposure to 
a known danger; it embraces a mental state of 
willingness; it pertains to the preliminary conduct 
of getting into a dangerous employment or rela-
tion; it means voluntarily incurring the risk of an 
accident, which may not occur, and which the 
person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid; 
it defeats recovery because it is a previous aban-
donment of the right to complain if an accident 
occurs. Contributory negligence arises out of a 
tort; the essence of it is carelessness; it may or 
may not imply intentional exposure to a known 
danger; it is a matter of conduct; a contributorily 
negligent act leads more immediately to a specific 
accident. 
"Another difference is that assumption of 
risk denies defendant's negligence while contribu-
tory negligence admits defendant's negligence but 
denies it is the proximate cause of the accident. 
65 CJS Negligence § 117, pp 709-11; 38 Am. Jur., 
Negligence, § 172, p. 847." 
A case very similar to the one at bar is Brady v. 
Kane (Fla.), 111 So. 2d 4 72 ( 1959). In that case plaintiff 
was hit in the head ·with a golf club. In rejecting the de-
fense of assumption of risk, the court stated: 
"Appellee contended that appellant assumed 
the risk of the injury which occurred. Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party moved against, that defense was not appli-
cable on the facts as they stood at the close of 
the plaintiff's case. Therefore, at the least, the 
question was one for the jury. 'Voluntary ex-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
posure is the bedrock upon which the doctrine of 
assumed risk rests. Appreciation of the danger 
is an essential to the defense of assumption of 
risk * *.' Bartholf v. Baker, Fla., 1954, 71 So. 2d 
480, 483. A member of a golfing foursome as-
sumes certain obvious and ordinary risks of the 
sport by participating therein with knowledge of 
its normal dangers, but a player does not assume 
a risk which cannot reasonably be anticipated, and 
which may be the result of improper and un-
authorized negligent action of another player." 
The defense of assumption of risk is really a mis-
nomer. What it amounts to is either relieving the de-
fendant of a duty of ordinary care toward plaintiff, or it 
is a failure on the part of the plaintiff to take reason-
able care for his own safety. In speaking of this defense, 
it is stated in 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, 
§ 21.8, p. 1191 : 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk, however 
it is analyzed and defined, is in most of its as-
pects a defendant's doctrine which restricts lia-
bility and so cuts down the compensation of acci-
dent victims. It is a heritage of the extreme in-
dividualism of the early industrial revolution. But 
quite aside from any questions of policy or of 
substance, the concept of assuming the risk is 
purely duplicative of other more widely under-
stood concepts, such as scope of duty or contribu-
tory negligence. The one exception is to be found 
perhaps, in those cases where there is an actual 
agreement. Moreover, the expression has come 
to stand for two or three distinct notions which 
are not at all the same, though they often overlap 
in the sense that they are applicable to the same 
situation. 
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"Except for express assumption of risk, 
therefore, the term and the concept should be 
abolished. It adds nothing to modern law except 
confusion. For the most part the policy of indi-
vidualism it represents is outmoded in accident 
law; where it is not, that policy can find full 
scope and far better expression in other language. 
There is only one thing that can be said for as-
sumption of risk. In the confusion it introduces, 
it sometimes- ironically and quite capriciously-
leads to a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some 
other field. The aura of disfavor that has come 
to surround it may occasionally turn out to be 
the kiss of death to some other bad rule with which 
it has become associated. We have seen how this 
may happen with the burden of pleading and 
proving an exceptional limitation on the scope of 
defendant's duty. There may be other instances. 
But at best this sort of thing is a poor excuse in-
deed for continuing the confusion of an unfortun-
ate form of words." 
It is submitted that the giving of this instruction was 
error and that it could only lead to confusion and mislead 
the jury. This doctrine had no proper place in the case. 
POINT II. 
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS 
AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SAID 
SUBJECT. 
Even if it were conceded that assun1ption of risk 
was properly an issue in the case, the court committed 
manifest error in the instruction itself. It did not limit 
this so-called defense to the proposition that plaintiff 
must know and appreciate the danger. The court per-
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mitted this defense to exist in the event that plaintiff 
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have 
known that a danger existed in the conduct of defendant. 
The trial court's Instruction No. 8 (R. 19) embodies this 
defense, which is defendant's requested Instruction No. 
14 (R. 43). The defendant invited this manifest error. 
The court instructed the jury: 
"'Instruction No. 8 
"There is a legal phrase commonly referred 
to be the term 'assumption of risk' which is as 
follows: 
"One is said to assume a risk when he volun-
tarily assents to dangerous conduct and volun-
tarily exposes himself to that danger, or when 
he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
should know, that a danger exists in the conduct 
of another, and voluntarily places himself, or 
remains, in a position of danger. One who has 
thus assumed the risk is not entitled to recover 
for damage caused to him without intention, 
and which results from the dangerous condition 
or conduct to which he thus exposed himself." 
(Italics ours) 
If there is anything clear in the law of assumption 
of risk it is that plaintiff must know and ,appreciate the 
danger involved. An instruction almost exactly the same 
as this was held prejudicial error in Johnson v. Maynard, 
9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d 884. In speaking of the instruC-
tion in that case the court stated : 
"It is further to be observed that the court 
did not correctly instruct the jury on assumption 
of risk had it been applicable. In the first portion 
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of Instruction No. 7 he correctly imposed the re-
quirement that, 'she freely, voluntarily and know-
ingly manifest * * * her assent to dangerous con-
duct * * * .' but later in the same instruction ex-
plained that it would be applicable if the plaintiff 
knows, '* * * or in the exercise of ordinary care 
would know, that danger exists * * *.' The latter 
statement is in error because it would permit a 
finding of assumption of risk, exonerating the 
defendant from liability, without actual knovdedge 
of such danger on the part of the plaintiff." 
In Rogers v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Cal. 2d 
414, 289 P. 2d 226 (1955), it was held that the trial court 
properly refused to give a request similar to that made 
by defendant and given in this case. The court stated: 
"Transit Lines and Feb claim error in the 
refusal to give their offered instruction on as-
sumption of risk. Suffice it to say the offered 
instruction was erroneous in that it advised the 
jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in the 
exercise of ordinary care he would have known 
and appreciated the danger rather than that he 
must have knowledge of the danger." 
In Garcia v. San Gabriel Ready Mix, 155 Cal. App. 
2d 568, 318 P. 2d 145 (1957) the court pointed out how 
important this matter of knowledge is. It there stated: 
'• However many instructions on assumption 
of the risk may be given, and however they n1ay be 
worded, one essential is that the jury be told 
that a person must know what risk he assumes." 
We submit that this instruction was completely er-
roneous in permitting assumption of risk to be found 
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under circumstances where plaintiff in the exercise of 
ordinary care, should have known that a danger existed. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial court not only committed 
error in permitting a jury to pass upon the defense of 
assumption of risk, but also committed error in its defini-
tion of this defense. We submit that the verdict in favor 
of defendant "No Cause of Action" should be reversed 
and plaintiff granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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